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Summary of the thesis 
The thesis consists of four selfcontained papers 
Paper 1:  
he long term effect of own and spousal parental leae on mothers earnings 
 e tae advantage of the introduction of a Norwegian parental leave reform in  to 
identify the causal effect of parental leave on mothers’ longterm earnings The reform raised 
the total leave period y seven wees ut reserved four wees for the father The reform 
process was fast so all mothers were already pregnant at the time of the policy 
announcement Applying a regression discontinuity design we find that women who had their 
last child immediately after the policy change had higher mean yearly earnings from  to 
 and longrun yearly earnings in our last year of data in  compared to women who 
had their last child immediately efore the reform owever the estimate is sensitive to 
etreme oservations to restrictions regarding eligiility and to the eclusion of oservations 
within a window of three days efore and after the reform  
Paper 2:  
o laws affect attitudes An assessment of the orwegian prostitution law using 
longitudinal data  orthcoming in International Review of Law and Economics
The uestion of whether laws affect attitudes has inspired scholars across many disciplines 
ut empirical nowledge is sparse sing longitudinal survey data from Norway and weden 
collected efore and after the implementation of a Norwegian law criminaliing the purchase 
of seual services we assess the shortrun effects on attitudes using a differenceindifferences 
approach n the general population the law did not affect moral attitudes toward prostitution 
owever in the Norwegian capital where prostitution was more visile efore the reform 
the law made people more negative toward uying se This supports the claim that proimity 
and visiility are important factors for the internaliation of legal norms 
Paper 3:  
oes informal eldercare impede womens employment he case of uropean welfare 
states orthcoming in Feminist Economics
European states vary in eldercare policies and in gendered norms of family care and this 
study uses these variations to gain insight into the importance of macrolevel factors for the 
worcare relationship sing advanced panel data methods on European ommunity 
ousehold anel E data this study finds women’s employment to e negatively 
associated with informal caregiving to the elderly across the European nion The effects of 
informal caregiving seem to e more negative in the outhern European countries less 
negative in the Nordic countries and in etween these etremes in the entral European 
countries included in the study This study eplains that since eldercare is a choice in 
countries with more formal care and less pronounced gendered care norms the weaer impact 
of eldercare on women’s employment in these countries has to do with the degree of degree of 
coercion in the caring decision 
Paper 4:  
he employment costs of caregiing in orway  
nformal eldercare is an important pillar of modern welfare states and the ongoing 
demographic transition increases the demand for it while social trends reduce the supply 
ustantial opportunity costs of informal eldercare in terms of forgone laor opportunities 
have een identified yet the effects seem to differ sustantially across states and there is a 
controversy on the effects in the Nordic welfare states n this study the effects of informal 
care on the proaility of eing employed the numer of hours wored and wages in Norway 
are analyed using data from the ife curse eneration and ender  survey New 
and previously suggested instrumental variales are used to control for the potential 
endogeneity eisting etween informal care and employmentrelated outcomes n total eing 
an informal caregiver in Norway is found to entail sustantially less costs in terms of forgone 
formal employment opportunities than in nonNordic welfare states 
Paper 

he longterm effect of parental leae on mothers 
earnings 
Andreas otsadama  Elisaeth greninov a and enning inseraas a
Astract 
 e tae advantage of the introduction of a Norwegian parental leave reform in  to 
identify the causal effect of parental leave on mothers’ longterm earnings The reform raised 
the total leave period y seven wees ut reserved four wees for the father The reform 
process was fast so all mothers were already pregnant at the time of the policy 
announcement Applying a regression discontinuity design we find that women who had their 
last child immediately after the policy change had higher mean yearly earnings from  to 
 and longrun yearly earnings in our last year of data in  compared to women who 
had their last child immediately efore the reform owever the estimate is sensitive to 
etreme oservations to restrictions regarding eligiility and to the eclusion of oservations 
within a window of three days efore and after the reform  
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1ntroduction 
 hy do mothers have lower earnings than childless women? Three hypotheses have een 
particularly prominent in the literature According to the depreciation hypothesis career 
interruptions due to maternity leave reduce wages via less wor eperience or depreciation of 
human capital Alrecht et al  incer and olache  The selection hypothesis 
argues that the correlation etween motherhood and earnings the child penalty or the 
family gap is spurious and reflects selection into motherhood underg and ose  
and perhaps into familyfriendly ut lowwage sectors Nielsen et al  inally the 
specialiation hypothesis argues that the correlation is due to mothers specialiing in domestic 
wor which maes them less productive in the laor maret ecer  or that employers 
ehave as if this is the case 
n the present study we tae advantage of the introduction of a Norwegian parental leave 
reform which affects parents with children orn after  April  to identify the composite 
causal effect of own and spousal parental leave on mothers’ earnings in the  period 
and to investigate the arguments underlying the different mechanisms used to eplain the 
child penalty arental leave has een found to reduce earnings for mothers eg Alrecht et 
al  owever most studies have een unale to control for the inherent prolems of 
selection into parental leave and the endogeneity of the decision to ecome a parent The 
reform we investigate raised the total leave period y seven wees ut at the same time 
introduced a daddy uota of four wees that is four wees were tied to the father and the 
parents lost these wees of leave if the father did not use them The remaining increase of 
three wees could e used y any parent ostly mothers have ended up using this etra time 
as with the other transferale wees Thus the nature of this policy reform allows us to 
eamine the strength of the different mechanisms proposed to eplain the child penalty since 
we identify the net longrun effect of these opposing mechanisms f time away from wor 
depreciates mothers’ human capital as the depreciation hypothesis argues the reform should 
have a negative effect on mothers’ earnings f instead specialiation is the ey mechanism 
we should epect the reform to increase mothers’ earnings since mothers’ relative 
specialiation into childrearing is reduced  
ur identification strategy uses the fact that the reform cutoff date is sharp that the mothers 
were already pregnant when the reform was decided and that the data has the eact day of 
irth for all parents of Norwegian children orn around the time of the cutoff n particular 
the regression discontinuity design allows us to estimate the longrun effects of the reform y 
comparing mothers who are generally similar with the eception that some gave irth 
immediately efore the reform and some gave irth immediately after the reform ince 
selection into having children is therey controlled for we have a very promising research 
design to detect the causal effect of the reform on mothers’ earnings  
everal studies starting with incer and olache  eamine the effects of career 
interruptions on women’s earnings and find that longterm earnings are negatively affected y 
time away from wor This finding is usually interpreted as an effect of human capital 
depreciation uhm  eplores how changes in parental leave schemes affected the 
gender gap in employment outcomes in nine European countries from  to  and finds 
that parental leave increases the employment proaility of women ut that etended 
durations more than nine months reduce women’s wages as compared to men’s Alrecht et 
al  use wedish data and rely on fied effects estimations to eamine the effects of 
taing parental leave on mothers’ and fathers’ future wages and find that the effect is lower on 
mothers’ wages than on fathers’ wages ince almost all mothers too parental leave at the 
time of the study there was no signaling effect for women ie taing parental leave did not 
signal a low attachment to the o or a low motivation for wor while parental leave for men 
may have conveyed a strong signal since there was no daddy uota in weden at the time of 
their data collection and very few fathers were on parental leave   
A numer of recent studies address the selection prolem of the early studies y using 
parental leave reforms as natural eperiments Eerg et al  compare parents with 
children orn ust efore and ust after the introduction of the wedish daddy uota and find 
strong effects on fathers’ leavetaing ut no effects on suseuent leave taen for sic 
children They interpret the latter finding as a no learningydoing effect of domestic laor 
specialiation This interpretation is in contrast to the results of otsadam and inseraas 
 who using a similar design find a longrun  years effect of the first Norwegian 
daddy uota on the division of household laor A plausile interpretation of the different 
findings is that while otsadam and inseraas  rely on various survey items of 
household division of laor Eerg et al’s  proy for household wor ie leave to 
tae care of sic children also involves a relationship to employers As Eerg et al  
readily admit taing the signaling theory as a asis for the negative effect found on earnings 
in previous studies the daddy month made a lot of fathers tae parental leave thus the 
signaling effect was low owever since the reform did not affect sic leave enefits taing 
sic leave may involve a lot of signaling These studies have a high internal validity yet the 
results regarding the longrun effects of specialiation are mied urthermore the studies do 
not eamine the wage effects of parental leave  
luve and Tamm  evaluate the effects of parental leave on female employment y 
using a erman reform in  with strong incentives for fathers to tae parental leave 
nterestingly they find no longrun year effects for mothers owever mothers were 
more liely to wor  years after the reform if they were suect to the reform No effects 
are found for fathers nfortunately their data only includes month of irth and they do not 
have a representative sample of the population as their sample is iased with regard to age 
numer of children and income alive and weimller  use the increase of parental 
leave from one to two years in  and the decrease to  months in  in Austria to 
investigate the effects on employment wages and fertility of mothers who had their first 
child around the reform dates They find that longer parental leave increases fertility and 
reduces employment and wages in the short run ut not in the long run  years oreover 
the proaility of eing employed does not differ etween the treatment and control groups 
from the third year onwards and the level of earnings is not different from the fourth year 
onwards Although interesting the study does not shed any light on the effects of spousal 
parental leave for women  
ohansson  eplores the effects of oth own and spousal parental leave on earnings 
using two wedish parental leave reforms he first controls for timeinvariant heterogeneity 
using fied effects models and finds that oth own and spousal parental leave affect future 
earnings of parents nterestingly while own leave is negative for earnings spousal leave 
raises earnings ut only for women n fact the effect of spousal leave is found to e larger 
than the effect of own leave for women he then uses the reforms to estimate triple difference 
models using families who gave irth to their first child in Decemer or anuary around the 
time of the reforms which were implemented on  anuary or one year efore The families 
are oserved one year efore the reform and three years after the reform  hile the estimates 
are imprecise they point in the same direction as the fied effects estimates The fied effects 
estimates are however suect to critiue since fertility decisions may e correlated with time 
variant unoserved heterogeneity ohansson  herself gives an eample where fertility 
responds to income shocs The more fleile triple differences model is more roust to such 
criticism yet the resulting estimates ecome very imprecise  
ege and olli  use Norwegian registry data to investigate the longrun effects of 
parental leave on fulltime employed fathers’ earnings They restrict the sample to fathers 
with their youngest children eing  years old during the years  They tae 
advantage of the daddy uota reform in  and compare earnings in a given year etween 
treated and nontreated fathers ased on their children’s age in years and find that the reform 
reduces fathers’ earnings y  percent ince the fathers in the sample have children of 
different ages the authors estimate a difference in differences model and compare with the 
corresponding earnings difference efore the daddy uota ince their sample includes 
children aged  the usual difference in differences assumption of similar time trends of 
fathers asent the reform is unliely to e very reliale mainly ecause other family policies 
were introduced during the period and some parents had children in school and some did not 
urthermore they only have yearly data on time of irth and treat children orn in  as the 
first fully treated cohort astly they do not investigate the impact of the reform on mothers’ 
earnings 
inally ools et al  use Norwegian registry data to investigate the longrun effects of 
parental leave on several different outcomes including mothers’ wages omewhat 
surprisingly they find a statistically significant negative effect of the daddy uota on mothers’ 
earnings and speculate that there are complementarities in child rearing They restrict their 
sample to parents with earnings aove two times the asic amount in the Norwegian social 
insurance system and eclude those who gave irth two wees efore and after the reform 
date since they find an indication of strategic irth planning Their treatment and control 
groups are not as clean as ours as they do not restrict the analysis to the last child only y 
allowing parents in the control group to have children in later years they ecome treated y 
the reform as well Even more prolematic is the fact that the groups differ in the type of 
treatment they received eg no parents in the control group eperienced the reform for their 
first child As we discuss elow there are arguments for and against the different restrictions 
and we eamine how the results change accordingly 
The policy change we use creates a natural eperiment that allows us to evaluate the net long
run effects of oth own and spousal parental leave on mothers’ earnings the theoretical 
mechanisms ehind women’s child penalty can therey e investigated in a credile way n 
terms of identification the present paper is the first paper to use a formal regression 
discontinuity design to investigate the effects of parental leave on earnings The longterm 
effects may e sustantial if the daddy uota reduces mother specialiation into child rearing 
ege and olli  and if it affects the future division of household tass or spousal 
relative human capital endowments otsadam and inseraas  ohansson  
 e find that women who had their last child immediately after the policy change have higher 
mean yearly earnings from  to  and longrun yearly earnings in our last year of data 
in  compared to women who had their last child immediately efore the reform 
owever the estimates are sensitive to etreme oservations and to the eclusion of cases 
where the parents might not have een eligile for paid parental leave erhaps more 
alarming the results are sensitive to the eclusion of oservations in the days around the 
cutoff This finding supports those of ools et al  and suggests that strategic irth 
planning may have taen place even though the mothers were already pregnant at the time of 
policy announcement   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows The net section presents the reform and 
outlines our hypotheses ections  and  present the empirical strategy and the data ection 
 presents the results and ection  entails further roustness tests of those results The final 
section concludes the paper 
2 he orwegian parental leae scheme and the 13 reform
Norway lie the other candinavian countries has for decades operated what has een 
laeled a womenfriendly welfare state ernes  where the topic of eual opportunities 
in employment and domestic wor has een central n Norway paid parental leave has a long 
history and three historical shifts can e identified N  The parental leave system 
was first ustified y mothers’ healthrelated necessity to e asent from wor and aimed to 
compensate for lost income in connection with pregnancy and care for small children A si
wee paid maternity leave was introduced as far ac as in  and a wee paid 
maternity leave was introduced in  although only for women with health insurance n 
 sicness enefit ecame compulsory for all employed citiens and thus a wee paid 
maternity leave ecame availale for all woring women  
The second shift started in the late s when the pulic deate for a further increase in the 
numer of days turned from protection of women’s health and employment to eual rights in 
the laor maret Not until  did fathers gain the right to go on parental leave as it was 
epanded to  wees and only the first si wees after the irth were reserved for mothers 
During the s the numer of wees was increased several times  
The third shift in Norwegian familywor policies occurred in the s as the parental leave 
policy turned from eual rights to eual opportunities rom  to  the right to tae 
paid parental leave was gradually etended from  to  wees t was a disappointing 
matter of fact that an overwhelming maority of the parental leave was taen y mothers 
N  To increase the fathers’ uptae rates Norway was the first country in the world 
to introduce a daddy uota on  April  where fathers to children orn on or after this 
date got an independent right to parental leave The reform etended the parental leave from 
 to  wees with full earnings compensation of which four wees were reserved for the 
father At this time paid paternity leave was contingent on oth parents woring at least  
percent efore the child was orn and the payment to fathers was reduced if the mother did 
not wor full time n addition fathers were not eligile for paid parental leave unless they 
had wored at least si out of the last ten months athers were entitled to use the daddy uota 
up until the child turned three years of age although  percent of those taing leave in 
 did so during the child’s first year ege and olli   
nducing fathers to tae more responsiility for child rearing was seen as an important step on 
the way to eual division of laor and toward reducing the gender wage gap The political 
arguments to earmar some of the parental leave for fathers were threesome firstly this 
policy implementation gives a strong signal and possiilities to e more actively involved in 
child rearing and hence to challenge norms of male readwinning eira  econdly an 
independent right to parental leave gives fathers an advantage when two parents discuss the 
distriution of their parental leave Thirdly the law strengthens fathers’ argument for parental 
leave in discussions with reluctant employers The reform led to a sharp increase in the uptae 
                                                
 ncome compensation spanned up to a ceiling of si times the asic amount of the Norwegian social insurance 
system The asic amount is adusted on a yearly asis and was  N in  ost employers 
compensate for the amount aove the ceiling 
 n fact parents could choose to either tae the  wees with full compensation or  wees with   
earnings compensation Note that the choice etween taing a shorter period with full coverage or a longer 
period with less coverage has een availale since  and was not a new feature of this reform 
rate from less than four percent prior to the reform to  percent in  running and 
lantenga    
3 mpirical strategy 
ince all parents who had their last latest child after the reform date were treated y the 
reform and no parents who had their last child efore the reform date were treated we should 
e ale to compare the two groups of parents in order to identify the causal effects of the 
reform  e also eploit the fact that since the policy process was so fast parents who gave 
irth around the time of the reform threshold could not have nown aout the reform at the 
time of conception The specific design including  April  as the day of implementation 
was proposed on  Decemer  and decided in parliament on  anuary 
 e start y running  regressions of earnings on treatment for groups who had children 
ust efore and ust after the reform The euation to e estimated is thus 
β+χ+α= ii TreatmentEarnings X ii ε+   
where Treatment is an indicator variale that euals one for those who had children ust after 
the reform in  X  is a vector of predetermined variales the age of the parents at the 
time of irth numer of children efore  and lagged values of income and iε is an error 
term The sample windows presented in the main analyses are chosen to e two wees si 
wees and three months  
The twowee sample is our random sample n theory using this sample corresponds well 
with what osenweig and  olpin  lael a natural natural eperiment where nature 
determines which side of the cutoff date people end up on irst it is not possile for parents 
to completely control the date of conception Erisson  alive and weimller  
econd a pregnancy taes on average  wees and the duration is normally distriuted with 
a standard deviation of two wees Eerg et al  Erisson  ost importantly 
however none of the parents new that they would e treated at the time of conception Thus 
                                                
 The overnment first proposed to introduce a daddy uota of four wees in the state udget for  which 
was accepted y the Norwegian parliament on  Novemer  udsettinnst  nr   At this 
time however the eact date of implementation was not nown  
it seems reasonale that the reform creates eogenous variation in own and spousal parental 
leave and longrun differences in outcomes can plausily e attriuted to the change in 
legislation cf luve and Tamm  alive and weimller  irths can not e 
postponed and the studied reform is strictly favorale for parents so triggering of irth y 
medical means such as y a cesarean section see ohansson  should in principle not e 
a prolem A prolem may occur however if triggering of irths is postponed y the reform 
 e will assess such fine tuning y ecluding mothers who gave irth three days efore and 
after  April 
n the threemonth sample there is a statistically significant difference etween the groups 
with respect to the parents’ age n the other samples this is not the case  e choose to present 
results oth with and without parents’ age in  since it is predetermined and plausily 
eogenous ncluding eogenous variales is liely to increase the precision of the estimates 
without iasing the treatment coefficient  
 e also use the reform in a sharp regression discontinuity D design as the treatment of 
eing offered a daddy uota and a prolonged leave is a deterministic and discontinuous 















The forcing variale days is epected to e negatively associated with earnings as parents of 
younger children are younger and since they have a higher worload at home mportantly 
however the relationship etween days and earnings is assumed to e smooth so that any 
discontinuity at the threshold can e attriuted to the causal effect of the parental leave 
reform n our case the continuous effect of days is controlled for y estimating 
iiiiii TreatmentdaysTreatmentdaysaEarnings ελχβ ++++=   
The smoothness assumption allows us to estimate the difference etween two regression 
functions at day  χ is still our parameter of interest and it is identified y separating the 

continuous function of days from the discontinuity imposed y the treatment y including 
the interaction term etween days and Treatment we allow the slope coefficients to differ on 
each side of the threshold This is the same as estimating the two regression functions elow 
and calculating the difference in intercepts a1-a2  
 ≥++= iiii daysifdaysaEarnings εβ
 <++= iiii daysifdaysaEarnings εβ 
A first step in the D will e to estimate the earnings euation with a linear time trend and 
samples close to the cutoff This local linear regression approach is less liely to e valid with 
larger andwidths unless we now that the underlying function for the forcing variale is 
indeed linear and the roustness should e checed y varying the time window ee and 
emieu   
The function for days does not have to e linear and we rela the linearity assumption y 
including polynomial functions of days in the regression model That is in order to assess the 
roustness of the treatment effect we also estimate nd rd and th order polynomial 
functions omparing the D results to the results of a discontinuity sample with 
oservations close to the discontinuity such as the two wees sample is an important 
roustness chec since the treatment effect in such a sample does not depend on neither the 
model specification or a constant effects assumption Angrist and ische   
ne potential prolem for identification of causal effects of the reform is that there is a 
difference among parents of children orn at different times This difference arises y 
construction since the data is collected at the end of the year implying that one group always 
has younger children  e deal with this issue y presenting regression results on falsification 
samples where those included had children either during the month efore or the month after 
the reform These placeo regressions should yield statistically insignificant results as the 
groups are faced with the same parental leave regulation inally neither of the approaches 
discussed thus far account for possile iological or social differences etween parents of 
children orn in arch or April To account for such differences we also present regression 
results on falsification samples where those included had children around the same dates ut 
one year after the reform 

4 ata samples and descriptie statistics 
 e rely on high uality register data encompassing all individuals in Norway The data is 
gathered from several administrative registers used to calculate taes pension rights and 
unemployment enefits and attrition elfreport prolems and ias due to refusal to 
participate in the study are noneistent 
ur dependent variales are derived from two different measures yearly income ased on 
accumulation of pension Personal income and yearly laor income oth measures are gross 
of taes and are measured at the end of the year Personal income mainly includes 
employment income and income from selfemployment n addition unemployment enefit 
sicness enefit maternity enefit and adoption allowance are included and it is also possile 
to acuire accumulation of pension on the asis of nonpaid caring wor for family memers 
A disadvantage in addition to measuring not only income stemming from wor is that 
personal income is left and rightcensored ncomes elow or eual to one asic amount and 
aove or eual to  asic amounts do not ualify for accumulation of pension and therefore 
do not enter into the measure of Personal income Labor income includes wages and salaries 
from paid employment as well as net entrepreneurial income rom the Labor income variale 
we create our two main dependent variales ie Earnings 2005 which is simply laor 
income in  and Mean earnings which is the mean yearly laor income from  to 
 Labor income is only availale from  onwards and the use of personal income is 
restricted to estimations including oservations efore  
The data includes information on the eact day of irth of all children orn in Norway  e 
restrict our sample to individuals orn in Norway for whom we have information aout oth 
the parents and the children As mentioned in the empirical strategy we focus on samples 
with parents of children orn close to the reform cutoff and only on children orn in the same 
year  e do this to minimie other confounding factors such as different school enrollment 
years urthermore we focus on parents whose last child was orn in  since those who 
also had children later on were then affected y the reform nvestigating the effects only for 
these parents is necessary in order to have a clean comparison etween treated and control 
individuals yet it may e prolematic to generalie the results to the total population if the 
reform affected the total fertility rate This is so since our sample then consists of a special 
type of individuals not affected in their fertility decision y the reform  e investigate this y 
comparing all mothers who had a child around the reform and find no difference etween 

mothers who had a child ust efore and mothers who had a child ust after the reform in the 
numer of children they had after the reform results are availale upon reuest This is 
important since it implies that those affected y the reform are not different in their completed 
fertility patterns from those in the control group a crucial feature for the internal validity of 
the estimation strategy t is also prolematic to focus on the lastorn child if the reform 
affects mothers differently depending on whether or not they have other children f the 
treatment effect is larger for those having their first child eg y setting durale patterns for 
new parents we are liely to underestimate the effect of the reform and if the reform 
affected mothers who already had other children more strongly eg since they had a larger 
worload with respect to unpaid childcare we may e overestimating the treatment effect 
 e investigate this y matching mothers of the same irth parity and comparing those who 
had their last child ust efore and ust after the reform conditional on irth parity The results 
availale upon reuest suggest that the coefficient for the treatment indicator generally rises 
with the numer of children orn efore the reform suggesting that there are larger effects of 
the reform on women’s earnings if the women already had children from efore This has 
implications for the eternal validity of our results as we are more liely to include mothers 
who already had other children at the time of the reform y focusing on the last orn child 
which is necessary for internal validity than if we would have focused on mothers of any 
child orn around the time of the reform ence our results may e overestimated as 
compared to the average effect of the reform for all parents 
Tale  presents summary statistics y treatment status for our three main samples  e see 
that the mothers in the treatment group had higher yearly earnings in  our last year of 
data and higher mean earnings from  to  than mothers in the control group note 
however that the second difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels in the 
threemonth sample  e also see that there is a difference etween the parents in the 
treatment and control groups in the threemonth sample with respect to their age at the time of 
irth No such difference is present for the shorter time windows and the samples are also 
alanced in the numer of children they had efore the last child was orn inally it is 
reassuring to see that the mothers in the treatment and control cohorts did not have 
statistically significant different personal income in  and as seen in Tale  elow 
neither is there a difference etween the groups in personal income for other years efore the 
reform we do not have data on laor income efore  

Tale  ummary statistics of treatment and control groups for different time windows
Control groups Treatment groups
Three-month sample
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
       
Earnings 2005 5647 246948* 173914 6138 253227 191021 
Mean earnings 5647 177365 111404 6138 180065 114231 
Mothers’ age 93 5647 31.2*** 4.8 6138 30.8 4.8 
Fathers’ age 93 5647 33.9*** 5.8 6138 33.6 5.8 
No. of children before 5647 1.2 0.8 6138 1.2 0.8 
Personal income 1988 5647 81428 64725 6138 83173 64615 
       
Six-week sample
 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
       
Earnings 2005 2812 243883** 161490 2990 253936 208096 
Mean earnings 2812 175015** 108173 2990 180900 116673 
Mothers’ age 93 2812 31.0 4.8 2990 30.9 4.7 
Fathers’ age 93 2812 33.6 5.8 2990 33.8 5.8 
No. of children before 2812 1.2 0.8 2990 1.2 0.8 
Personal income 1988 2812 81196 64377 2990 82835 64593 
       
       
Two-week sample
 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
       
Earnings 2005 870 247117* 158938 1018 262989 225270 
Mean earnings 870 178058* 109583 1018 188913 130499 
Mothers’ age 93 870 30.9 4.8 1018 30.9 4.7 
Fathers’ age 93 870 33.5 5.6 1018 33.9 5.7 
No. of children before 870 1.2 0.8 1018 1.2 0.9 
Personal income 1988 870 80524 62669 1018 81054 65388 
 p  p  p pvalues in twosided ttests of the difference etween 
treatment and control groups 
A crucial assumption of the identification strategy is that the reform is eogenous and hence 
that the density function of the forcing variale days is continuous f agents are ale to 
manipulate the time of irth the continuity assumption underlying identification may e 
violated As already discussed it is unliely that parents could precisely manipulate the time 
of irth since it is not possile for parents to completely control the date of conception and 
since none of the parents new at that time that they would e treated igure  shows 
histograms of the forcing variale with different in widths  days and  day and a visual 
inspection of the densities for days suggests that parents did not manipulate the time of irth 
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Figure 1: Histograms for days
 esults 
 e start y running  regressions of earnings on the treatment variale with different time 
windows Tale  shows the effect of the reform on mothers’ mean yearly earnings from  
to  anel A and on mothers’ yearly earnings in  anel  or transparency the 
first columns in each pair do not control for mothers’ age even though there is a statistically 
significant difference etween the groups in the threemonth sample  
The twowee sample is the theoretically random sample As discussed in the empirical 
strategy since a pregnancy lasts  wees on average with a standard deviation of two wees 
and since the reform was unnown at the time of conception this estimate should e as good 
as a random measure of the effect of the reform The threemonth and siwee samples are 
included for completeness to show the sensitivity with respect to the time window chosen  

Tale   regressions of earnings on the treatment variale for different time windows
anel A Dependent variale is ean earnings   
       
AAE  months  months  wees  wees  wees  wees 
       
Treatment       
       
others’ age        
       
onstant      
       
       
servations       
suared       
oust standard errors in parentheses 
 p  p  p 
anel  Dependent variale is Earnings in  
       
AAE  months  months  wees  wees  wees  wees 
       
Treatment       
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servations       
suared       
oust standard errors in parentheses 
 p  p  p 

As seen in anel A the coefficient for the treatment indicator is positive as epected and 
mostly statistically significant ie the reform affected mothers’ average yearly earnings 
positively The coefficient for the mothers’ age at the time of irth points in the epected 
direction and including it always raises the point estimates for the treatment effect and 
increases precision slightly The treatment effect is large ut somewhat imprecisely 
estimated and it varies sustantially across time windows asing our inference on the two
wee efore and after sample and controlling for age differences we see that mothers with 
children orn after the reform earned on average  N approimately  D 
more per year from  to   
n anel  we show the corresponding longrun effects of the daddy uota y eamining the 
difference etween treated and untreated mothers in yearly earnings in  ie more than 
 years after the reform The results are ualitatively similar to those in Tale  and we 
again note a sieale treatment effect n the two wees efore and after sample mothers who 
had their last child immediately after the daddy uota was introduced earned  N 
approimately  D controlling for age more in  than mothers who gave irth to 
their latest child immediately efore the reform  
Tale  shows the laor income and personal income in the two wees efore and after 
sample for all the years for which we have data or Labor income we see a statistically 
significant difference etween the groups for all ut two years after  ince we do not 
have data on laor income efore  it is reassuring to see that Personal income is never 
statistically significantly different etween the groups efore the reform ut that the 
difference is statistically significant in  out of  years after the reform  

Tale  Treatment effects y year for the two wees efore and after sample otained from 
 regressions Dependent variales are yearly laor income for all years after  and 
yearly personal income for all years
ear          
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aor income     missing missing missing missing missing
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oust standard errors in parentheses 
 p  p  p 
To tae advantage of the longitudinal feature of the data we estimate a difference in 
differences model with the two wees efore and after sample where the differences in 
earnings from  to  for the treatment group are compared to the same differences in 
earnings for the control group The results are presented in Tale  ince we do not have data 
on our preferred variale for earnings efore  the first column shows the results when 
we tae the difference etween Labor income in  and Personal income in  The 
results are similar to the treatment effect otained aove in Tales  and   hen using our 
inferior measure of earnings in oth  and  we see that the results point in the 
epected direction ut that the treatment effect is smaller possily since the variale is 
censored and it is not statistically different from ero 

Tale  Difference in differences estimates comparing differences in earnings etween 
treatment and control cohorts from  to 
   
AAE aor income ersonal income ersonal income
   
Treatment   
   
onstant   
   
   
servations   
suared   
oust standard errors in parentheses 
 p  p  p 
 e have seen that the results hint at a potentially large although somewhat imprecisely 
estimated effect of the reform that is in most cases statistically significant for oth outcome 
measures There are however still some concerns that need further investigation irst of all 
we note that the treatment effect is systematically larger in the twowee sample than in the 
other samples This is worrisome as we do not want our results to e driven y outliers close 
to the cutoff or even worse y strategic irth planning To reduce the influence of potential 
outliers we estimate the models with logged dependent variales n fact we tae 
logearnings in order not to drop individuals with ero earnings and therey condition on 
a possily endogenous variale Tale  presents the results and we note that while the 
results point in the same direction they are no longer statistically significant for Mean 
Earnings and not statistically significant in the two wees efore and after sample for 
Earnings 2005  e therey conclude that the results for Mean Earnings are not roust to a 
log transformation This will e eamined further in ection   

Tale   regressions of log earnings on the treatment variale for different time 
windows
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1 Calendar effects 
As discussed in the empirical strategy section we may worry that the effect is driven y a 
calendar effect where those treated have younger children at all times of measurement since 
earnings are measured at the same times for oth groups Thus we also use the month efore 
and the month after implementation of the reform as a asis for placeo regressions with a 
twowee window efore and after the reform These results are presented in Tale  elow 
The coefficients are statistically insignificant and they alternate in sign As a comparison the 
April real treatment effect is shown in olumns  and  
owever we may also worry that parents of children orn in the month after the reform are 
different than parents with children orn efore the reform for other reasons than pure 
calendar effects or instance ucles and ungerman  find that the timing of irths 
across the year in the  is dependent on mothers’ social standing n particular children orn 
in the winter are more liely to have unmarried loweducated and young mothers These 
differences may for eample occur if weather affects the risiness of seual ehavior 
differently among different groups of women ucles and ungerman  find however 

that the difference is driven y wanted irths and no effect is documented among mothers of 
unplanned children ence it seems to e the case that women of higher socioeconomic status 
have stronger preferences for nonwinter irths As argued aove it is not liely that such 
differences eist in the twowee sample where irth can e seen as a random event 
Nonetheless Tale  presents results from  regressions for a falsification two wees 
efore and after sample consisting of parents having their last child around the same calendar 
date in  As seen in the tales the treatment coefficients actually point in the other 
direction  
Tale   results from placeo regressions one month after and one month efore the true 
treatment Dependent variales are ean Earnings olumns  or Earnings  olumns 

 ean earnings arnings 2 
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 The corresponding figures for  can not e used in this respect since there was a reform of the parental 
leave system was implemented on  April  as well 

Tale   results from placeo regressions with mothers having their last child within a 
window of two wees efore or after  April  Dependent variales are ean earnings 
olumns  and Earnings  olumns 
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2 egression discontinuity results
The results aove are in most cases consistent with the hypothesis of a positive effect of the 
reform on mothers’ earnings n this section we will further eamine the causal effect y 
treating the reform as if it were random y inspecting the discontinuity in the earnings 
regression at the date of reform   
igures A and  show the main D results graphically using inned local averages for 
mean earnings A and earnings   The averages are daily unconditional means over 
the support of days and as seen in the superimposed regression lines of different polynomial 
orders there is a ump in mean earnings and earnings in  at day  ie on  April  All 
umps are statistically significant at least at the  percent level more on this in the formal 
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Figure 2B: Graphical representation of 2005 Earnings (1000 NOK)

A maor advantage of the D design is that treatment is as good as randomied in cases where 
individuals are unale to precisely control the forcing variale ee and emieu  As in 
a randomied controlled trial we can try to reect the assumption of randomiation since 
imprecise control has the testale prediction that the mean of the aseline variales are 
continuous in days  hile we cannot directly test whether the unoservale characteristics 
change discontinuously at the threshold it is more unliely that they do so if there are no 
discontinuities in the oservale characteristics 
n igure  elow we conduct linear graphical D analyses on the aseline covariates  e 
start y showing the graph for the lagged personal income of the treatment and control 
mothers in the top left graph ince these earnings were measured in  five years efore 
the mothers had their latest child we do not epect any difference etween the groups n fact 
we a see a small ump in the figure even at this date although it is very small and highly 
statistically insignificant The actual D estimate using a linear model is  with a standard 
error of  ince personal income  and earnings after the reform are highly 
correlated finding a discontinuity for the latter ut not for the former increases our faith in the 
validity of the D design  e also present similar graphs for mothers’ age at irth the top 
right graph and for the numer of children efore the reform the ottom left graph and 
again the data fails to reect the assumption of randomiation The actual D estimates have 
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Binned local averages. Bandwidth of one day ( 180 bins )
Figure 3: RD graph for baseline covariates
Net we move on to the numerical results of the D design which are shown in Tale  The 
tale shows the results for the three different time windows andwidths and for different 
polynomial functions The first row of results presents  regressions without controlling 
for days This amounts to a comparison of raw means etween treatment and control groups 
 e see that the results always point in the epected direction ut that the estimate fails to 
reach conventional levels of statistical significance when the andwidth is three months 
efore and after the reform for mean earnings olumn   e then present the local linear 
regressions polynomial of order one and note that the estimates are less roust to varying the 
andwidth as the statistical significance fails to reach conventional levels for half of the 
estimated models  e then proceed to add higher order polynomials to the regression 
functions in order to assess the roustness of the results ur preferred specifications are 
shown in old and two test results guide us in this choice The first test is a goodnessoffit 
test where the significance of a set of oneday in dummies are included as additional 
regressors in the models and pvalues of oint tests of statistical significance of these in 
dummies are presented in suare racets The decision rule is to add a higher order term to 

the polynomial until the in dummies are no longer ointly significant at the five percent level 
ee and emieu  Alternatively we can use the Aaie information criterion A of 
model selection which rewards goodness of fit ut also penalies overfitting The preferred 
model according to this test is the one with the lowest A value and this is presented in the 
penultimate row of the tale optimal order of the polynomial  hen the two tests do not 
allow us to reach the same conclusion as happens in olumn  we give priority to the first 
test That is if the function with the optimal order of the polynomial also passes the goodness 
of fit test then it is preferred otherwise we add polynomials until the first test is passed  
The sensitivity of the D results can also e assessed y including aseline covariates  e 
see in Tale  that adding age at the time of irth and numer of children efore  does 
not alter the discontinuity results of the preferred specifications This is interpreted as an 
additional  test of whether the oservale characteristics are distriuted smoothly around the 
threshold and the finding raises our confidence in the no manipulation assumption Net we 
add personal income in  as an additional regressor and note that the results are roust to 
this inclusion as well ecept for the threemonth sample of earnings in  which has a p
value slightly aove  inally ee and ard  suggest that when the forcing variale 
is discrete a parametric approach with clustered standard errors is preferred in order to reflect 
the imperfect fit of the function away from the threshold ur forcing variale days is indeed 
discrete and we therefore also run a regression including aseline control variales including 
also personal income in   and cluster the standard errors at days cf Doin and erreira 
 who also use daily age as the forcing variale in identifying the effects of school entry 
laws omparing the standard errors to those of the previous model without clustered 
standard errors we see that they are similar although the treatment effect in the twowee 
sample for earnings in  is now only statistically significant at  percent  

Tale  egression discontinuity results Dependent variales are ean earnings olumns 
 or Earnings  olumns 
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Notes oust standard errors in parentheses  p  p  p values in suare racets from 
a goodnessoffit test where the significance of a set of oneday in dummies included as additional regressors 
is ointly tested The optimal order of the polynomial is otained y Aaie’s information criterion The 
preferred specifications using these criteria are presented in old The aseline controls include mothers’ age at 
irth and numer of children efore the reform and the net row adds to these controls individual personal 
income in  The final row of results presents results where the standard errors are clustered at days 

 urther roustness checks 
1 treme oserations and strategic irth planning?
The results so far indicate that the treatment effect of the reform is not very roust to various 
choices of the researcher  e eamine this further in this section That the results for Mean 
earnings are not roust to a log transformation points to prolems of outliers To eplore this 
we eamine how sensitive the estimates are to the eclusion of etreme oservations ie 
more specifically the one percent in our sample with the lowest and highest earnings 
Tale  shows that some estimates are sensitive to eclusion of etreme oservations The 
results still point in the epected direction yet it seems as if the previous estimates were 
iased upwards especially if we include those with very high earnings Together with the fact 
that the treatment effect increases as we narrow the time window this points toward outliers 
close to the cutoff  hile we have argued that the eact irth date in a narrow interval is close 
to random since a irth can not e postponed and since triggering of irth is not liely due to 
the strictly etter parental leave conditions after the reform it is still possile that people have 
postponed triggering irths or eample a mother planning a caesarian section may want to 
have it done after the reform instead of efore To assess this type of fine tuning we eclude 
individuals within a range of three days efore and after the reform The logic is that while the 
triggering may e postponed it is unliely to e postponed for a longer period cf alive and 
weimller   

Tale   regressions of earnings on the treatment variale for different time windows
ecluding etreme oservations
anel A Dependent variale is ean earnings   
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The results for our dependent variales and different time windows are presented in Tale  
As is evident in the tale the results are not roust to the eclusion of mothers giving irth in 
the days ust around the cutoff This finding supports that of ools et al  and although 
it may e a coincidence it may also e an effect of strategic irth planning Although we are 

somewhat septical of the strategic irth argument since the dates of planned caesarian 
sections is a medical decision these results nevertheless imply that we cannot rule out that it 
indeed occurred 
Tale   regressions of earnings on the treatment variale for the different time
windows ecluding oservations three days efore and after the cutoff date Dependent 
variales are Earnings  olumns  and ean income olumns 



















       
Treatment       
       
onstant       
       
       
servations       
suared       
oust standard errors in parentheses 
 p  p  p 
2 Approimating eligiility rules?
Not all parents in our treatment group were eligile for paid parental leave as eligiility was 
contingent on mothers woring at least  percent of fulltime in si out of the ten months 
efore the child’s irth n addition the father had to have had paid wor in at least si out of 
the last ten months to e eligile Although we unfortunately do not have data on eligiility or 
parents’ woring hours we can use the information on personal income in  to create a 
proy for eligiility To eclude mothers and fathers who are not eligile for parental leave 
ecause of a wea attachment to the laor maret we follow ege and olli  and limit 
our sample to cases where the mother had earnings aove an indeed minimum of the asic 
amount  N in  and the father had earnings twice this level 

Tale   regressions of earnings on the treatment variale for the different time
windows ecluding parents with a wea attachment to the laor maret Dependent variales 
are Earnings  olumns  and ean income olumns 
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As seen in Tale  the treatment effect does not seem very roust to this restriction as it is 
mostly statistically insignificant and varies a great deal with respect to the andwidth chosen 
Together the results of the further roustness tests suggest that the treatment effects found in 
Tale  are sensitive not only to etreme oservations and to oservations closely around the 
reform date ut also to the eclusion of parents who are potentially not eligile for paid 
parental leave  
 Conclusion 
This paper is motivated y the uestions of why mothers have lower earnings than childless 
women and whether parental leave for fathers can reduce women’s child penalty revious 
research has argued that the negative correlation etween motherhood and earnings is due to 
the negative influence of career interruption on human capital formation selection into 
motherhood or mothers specialiing in domestic wor Accounting for selection into 
motherhood and distinguishing etween the human capital and the specialiation hypothesis 
are empirically challenging tass not only ecause it is difficult to discover eogenous 
changes in the incentives to tae parental leave ut also ecause gathering the empirical data 
to assess the impact of such a change is difficult

 e tae advantage of the introduction of a Norwegian parental leave reform that implied that 
parents with children orn on or after  April  had access to seven additional wees of 
parental leave of which four wees were reserved for the father a socalled daddy uota 
 e have access to register data with eact irth dates for all children orn around the reform 
and their mothers’ earnings development over a long period which allows us to estalish the 
composite causal effect of the reform on earnings According to the human capital 
depreciation hypothesis we should epect a negative effect of the reform on mothers’ 
earnings since the leave period was etended while according to the specialiation 
hypothesis the effect is liely to e positive as the daddy uota decreases mothers’ 
specialiation into child rearing 
 e find that the mothers in the treatment group have higher mean earning in the  
period and higher earnings in  than mothers in the control group esults from a 
regression discontinuity analysis suggest that there is a ump in earnings as a conseuence of 
the reform The sie of the treatment coefficient and the level of statistical significance do 
however vary somewhat depending on the time window chosen oreover the estimate of 
the earnings effect of parental leave is sensitive to etreme oservations in particular to the 
eclusion of the one percent highest earners in our data and the estimate is sensitive to the 
eclusion of parents suspected not to e eligile for paid parental leave n addition the 
estimate is sensitive to the eclusion of oservations three days efore and after the reform 
This last finding implies that we cannot rule out strategic irth planning even though the 
parents had no way of nowing aout the reform at the date of conception A possile 
mechanism may e postponement of planned caesarian sections The sensitivity of the 
estimates to the eclusion of oservations in the days around the threshold is even more 
puling as we could not reect the assumption of randomiation y testing the continuity of 
the aseline covariates ence the sensitivity may simply e a coincidence and we urge 
future research to investigate the effects of parental leave reforms on fine tuning of the irth 
date enerally we urge researchers to eamine very closely whether sorting can potentially 
pollute identification in regression discontinuity settings even in cases lie ours where sorting 
seems very unliely 
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 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables     
employed 12683  0.85 0.36 0 1  
hrswork 10630  3.56 0.44 0 4.62 
wage          10682           12.25             1.84                   0           16.08 
Main independent variables    
care 11082  0.09 0.28 0 1  
intensive_care 11045  0.02 0.14 0 1  
Control variables     
badhealth 12703  0.04 0.21 0 1  
woman 12752  0.51 0.50 0 1  
age 12752  42.14 13.02 18 65  
agesq 12752  19.45 11.04          3.24 42.25 
higed 12752  0.37 0.48 0 1  
meded 12752  0.44 0.50 0 1  
lowed 12752  0.19 0,39 0 1 
married 12751  0.49 0.50 0 1  
widow 12751  0.01 0.12 0 1  
divorced 12751  0.11 0.32 0 1  
single 12751  0.38 0.48 0 1 
children 12752  0.28 0.45 0 1  
partnerincome 11858  8.12 6.03 0 16.18 
Possible instruments
fatherage 12613 74.11 15.81 22 126 
motherage 12676 70.72 15.13 36 118 
motherbadhealth 12681  0.27 0.44 0 1  
fatherbadhealth 12591  0.15 0.36 0 1  
siblings 11736  2.34 1.53 0 18  
fatherbadmemory 12692  0.03 0.16 0 1  
motherbadmemory 12738  0.05 0.21 0 1  
fainneed 12575  0.05 0.21 0 1  
moinneed 12666  0.11 0.31 0 1  
livemother 12752  0.01 0.10 0 1  
livefather 12752  0.01 0.10 0 1  
Type of care     
within household(hh) 11084  0.03 0.17 0 1  
outside hh 11091  0.06 0.23 0 1  
within hh intensive 10453  0.01 0.12 0 1  
outside hh intensive 10755  0.01 0.09 0 1  

            
 
 non-caregiver caregiver intensive caregiver
Dependent variables    
employed 0.85 0.84 0.78**
hrswork 3.57 3.54** 3.57
wage 12.29 12.29 12.21
Control Variables 
badhealth 0.04 0.05 0.07*
woman 0.51 0.62*** 0.63***
age 43.09 45.49*** 46.43***
agesq 20.18 22.14*** 22.82***
higed 0.36 0.36 0.33
meded 0.45 0.43 0.43
lowed 0.19 0.21 0.24**
married 0.56 0.58 0.60
widow 0.01 0.02 0.02
divorced 0.12 0.15** 0.19**
single 0.30 0.25*** 0.19***
children 0.33 0.27*** 0.31
partnerincome  9.41 9.37 9.54
Possible instruments
fatherage 74.99 77.87*** 78.91***
motherage 71.56 74.74*** 75.77***
motherbadhealth 0.27 0.36*** 0.38***
fatherbadhealth 0.16 0.18** 0.23**
siblings 2.37 2.42 2.50
fatherbadmemory 0.03 0.06*** 0.09***
motherbadmemory 0.05 0.11*** 0.10***
fainneed 0.04 0.11*** 0.14***
moinneed 0.10 0.23*** 0.24***
livemother 0.01 0.02** 0.05***
livefather 0.01 0.01 0.03**
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